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NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
are performed on medical students and on prisoners. The desire to please
a professor or a parole board might preclude these individuals from giving
truly voluntary consent. Likewise, the special relationship of trust be-
tween a patient and his physician may induce many patients to consent
to any medical practices their doctors propose.29
Requiring the informed consent of every experimental subject raises
problems for investigators. Disclosure of enough facts to enable the subject
to make an informed decision may, in some cases, hinder legitimate scien-
tific inquiry. Investigators face an additional problem when they must
use minors as subjects. In general, the consent of the legally incompetent
is no defense to civil tort liability. Some courts have made an exception
so that the consent of a mature minor capable of understanding the con-
sequences of his act will protect a physician from liability not based on
negligence; but this exception has been held to be inapplicable where the
operation is non-therapeutic. The researcher should be required to obtain
the consent of the minor's guardian, which would usually be sufficient
to protect the minor's interests. Whenever the minor is old enough to
be capable of intelligent consideration of the issues involved, his consent
should be obtained as an additional precaution. 3
The inherent limitations in and impediments to informed consent raise
certain significant questions to which there are no ready, apparent
answers. How and to what extent whould the dynamics of the inner and
outer world, inherent in the nature of man, be considered in defining his ca-
pacity for self-determination and informed consent? How are these dynam-
ics affected by the nature and extent of the information given to the subject?
To what extent can and should the investigator ascertain from the subject
that informed consent has been obtained? The answers to these questions
most certainly have implications for the formulation, administration, and
review of the human experimentation process. 31
LAWRENCE EMMA
Deed Absolute in Lieu of Foreclosure-
A Cost and Delay Internalizer
A deed absolute in lieu of foreclosure1 may be defined as a "mortgagor/
debtor's" reconveyance of his equity of redemption in the defaulted prop-
erty to the "mortgagee/creditor" in consideration for the creditor's prom-
29 Mulford, supra note 3, at 106.
30 Id. at 107, 108.
31 KATZ, supra note 1, at 610.
1 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 775 (4th ed. 1951). Foreclosure is a termination of all
rights of the mortgagor or his grantee in the property covered by the mortgage, thus the def-
inition covers court foreclosure, strict foreclosure and the power of sale.
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ise to forbear from suing on the debt or foreclosing the security. An ex-
ample of such an arrangement may be illustrated by the following:
C owns Blackacre in fee and desires to sell said property to D for
$2000.00 on terms. D purchases Blackacre from C giving him a
$200 cash downpayment and a note for the $1800 balance, the note
to be secured by a Deed of Trust on Blackacre. C subsequently
recorded the Deed of Trust. Several months later, D defaults on
his note and upon inquiry, C ascertains that D has suffered financial
set backs and can no longer meet his obligation on the note. C
sympathizing with D's position, seeks to settle the problem extra-
judicially, by recommending that D reconvey Blackacre to C in
fee. In consideration of this reconveyance C agrees to forbear
suing on the note 2 and/or foreclosing the security. In essence, C is
attempting to obtain D's equity of redemption3 without going through
the legal process of foreclosure or a power of sale, both of which
entail a great deal of time and expense to both parties.
The general view is that a conveyance of a mortgagor's equity of re-
demption to the mortgagee is suspect, and there is a presumption of fraud
which must be rebutted by the mortgagee, or the deed absolute will be
deemed a mere mortgage which the debtor may redeem. 4 However, despite
the above presumption of fraud against the mortgagee, North Carolina has
a different rule which applies to the deed of trust-deed of trust note re-
lationship. In short, the courts hold that:
"there is no presumption of fraud but a presumption of regularity
in a transfer of the trustor's equity of redemption to the beneficiary's
because there is no fiduciary relationship between the trustor and
the beneficiary which is not lacking between the mortgagor and
the mortgagee." 5
The later presumption of regularity is clearly the better. The benefits of
two evidentiary tests for essentially the same substantive law are illusory.
The same general conclusion is drawn by other writers who have reviewed
the subject. 6 Inasmuch as most of the mortgages in this state are secured
via deeds of trust and the accompanying note, the trust problem is academic
at best. In relation to the above hypothetical example, there would be a
presumption of a valid conveyance 7 which could be rebutted if the mort-
gagor alleged and proved that the exclusion of a defeasance clause from
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 45, § 21-38 (1967) provides that if the mortgagee forecloses his
security, and if it was based on a purchase money mortgage he cannot obtain a deficiencyjudgment against the mortgagor/debtor for any deficiency arising from the foreclosure sale.
3 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 636 (4th ed. 1951). Equity of redemption is "the right of the
mortgagor of an estate to redeem the same after it has been forfeited at law, by a breach
of the condition of the mortgage, upon paying the amount of the debts interest and cost."
4 Brown v. Holland 221 N.C. 135 (1942).
5 Murphy v. Taylor 214 N.C. 393 (1938).
6 6 N.C.L. REV. 340 (1928); 13 N.C.L. REv. 334 (1935).
7 214 N.C. at 393.
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an otherwise deed absolute, resulted from ignorance, mistake, fraud or
undue advantage and this exclusion dehors the deed.8
It should be pointed out that there is a line of cases in North Carolina
dealing with the question of setting aside a prior deed of reconveyance for
fraud, undue pressure, etc. 9 These cases are cited when appropriate.
However, the scope of this paper deals with reviewing those instances
when a deed taken in lieu of foreclosure may be regarded by the courts as
a mortgage rather than an absolute conveyance and minimizing those
factors which would support a court to hold one way or the other.
WHY A DEED IN LIEU OF FORECLOSURE
Generally, foreclosure is a negative method of barring a mortgagor's
equity of redemption. It involves undue delays and costs to both the creditor
and debtor.10 Given a relevant fact situation, and the absence of legal im-
pediments to the transaction, a deed absolute could be a positive alterna-
tive to foreclosure. The mortgagor may consider the transaction as a vir-
tual "life-saver", by viewing the deed as a method to:
1. Default without incurring personal liability on the note (debt);
2. Terminate his obligation to pay taxes and assessments on the property;
3. Eliminate the possibility of having foreclosure cost taxed against him; 1
4. Protect his credit;
5. Settle the matter extra-judicially and with a minimum of adverse publicity.
While the creditor may be irritated that the debtor decided not to honor
his obligation, he too must be realistic and determine if his interests would
be better served by foreclosing the property or taking a deed absolute
instead. In making these determinations the creditor may:
1. Desire to internalize the delays which accompany foreclosure; 12
2. Desire to be recognized as the owner of record for tax and assessment
purposes;
3. Desire to avoid the foreclosure costs;
4. Desire to assist a distraught mortgagor who has fallen on financial
hard times.
THE PROBLEMS IN TAKING A DEED 3
The basic difficulty revolves around the problem of conveyance and
whether or not upon a future suit by the mortgagor, the court will find the
deed to be an absolute conveyance or a mere security interest in the prop-
' Isley v. Brown 253 N.C. 791 (1960).
9 Correll v. Hartness 261 N.C. 89 (1964).
10 G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 155 (2d ed. 1970).
'a N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 45, § 21-38 (1967).
' See N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 45, § 21-27 (Upset Bid on Real Property) which illustrates
the delay factors involved in statutory foreclosure proceedings.
13 See generally, 36 MICH. L. REV. 3 (1937); 31 Mo. L. REV. 312 (1966); 8 DRAKE L.
REV. 199 (1969) for a discussion of the pitfalls.
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erty. In considering whether or not the deed should be decreed an ab-
solute conveyance or a mortgage the courts generally look to the question
of consideration, 14 the bargaining power of the parties,' 5 who has posses-
sion, and other acts of ownership by the involved parties. 16
In addition the mortgagee should ascertain if there are any encumbrances
which will cloud the reconveyed deed. If any, the mortgagee would prob-
ably be safer to foreclose the property and cut off the junior encumbrances.
The mortgagee should also determine if the mortgagor is bankrupt. If
so, the conveyance may be for naught because the court could void any
conveyance made within four months of the date the mortgagor filed
bankruptcy. 1 7
THE PROCEDURE
As indicated in the premises, a deed absolute in lieu of foreclosure
would generally be given and subsequently accepted by parties who desire
to internalize their costs and delays. Yet, it has been shown that there are
inherent problems with this method of conveyance, and in order to minimize
pitfalls the parties should codify their intentions. The mortgagor should
realize that a sale and conveyance of the property to the mortgagee, with-
out a defeasance clause in the deed, is absolute and cannot be attacked at a
later date merely because the mortgagee finds himself in a better financial
situation.' 8 The mortgagee in turn should realize that any improprieties on
his part may give the court an excuse to decree the deed a mortgage rather
than an absolute deed.
In view of the foregoing, the following suggestions may prove illum-
inating:
The mortgagee should:
1. Obtain an initial written statement from the mortgagor expressing his
willingness to reconvey the property in exchange for a release from the debt.
2. Obtain an abstract of the title and determine if there are any junior mort-
gages or other encumbrances which would be a cloud on the title.
"i Compare 129 A.L.R. 1504 which holds inadequacy of consideration has some tendency
to show that a sale was not intended; with Davis v. Davis, 256 N.C. 473 (1962) which held
that adequacy of consideration is to be decided by the parties and the court will not re-
form their intentions, unless fraud, undue influence or oppression are present.
"s See McLead v. Bullard 84 N.C. 515 (1881) holding that the courts will scrutinize the
transactions to determine if it is free from undue influence and oppression; But see Isley
v. Brown 253 N.C. 791 (1960) holding that a court will not convert a deed absolute on its face
into a security instrument, if the maker of the note was negligent in his behavior.
16 The fact that a party has possession or exercises some semblance of control over the
property may be considered by the court in determining if a sale absolute was intended by
the parties.
" U.S.C. § 96 (a) and § 60 (a) states; if the debtor goes into bankruptcy within four months
of the recording of the mortgage, a bankruptcy court can set the mortgage aside as a preference.
Implied therein is that an absolute deed conveyed without sufficient consideration is in fact
a mortgage which fall within 60 (a).
18 253 N.C. 791.
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3. Determine with the mortgagor an agreed upon consideration to be given
for his equity of redemption. 19
4. Require that the mortgagor obtain independent counsel to explain the
legal ramifications of the various instruments.
5. On law day, require the mortgagor to convey the property via a general
warranty deed, rather than a mere quit claim deed which contains no war-
ranties. The mortgagee may desire to have a clause inserted in the deed
stating that the deed is absolute in form and not a mortgage, however,
this clause is of questionable value because it may cause a title researcher
to view the deed with skepticism. 20
6. In addition to the deed, require an affidavit from the mortgagor stating
the basis of the transaction, that the consideration is sufficient, that the
property is not encumbered (other than the note), and that independent
inquiry had been made into the transaction. 21
7. Promptly record the deed.
19 A CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 135 and § 137 (1952 ed.) suggests that the mort-
gagees forbearance to foreclose the security or sue on the note may be sufficient consideration
in those cases where the property has been held only a short whie or where the property
has depreciated in value. However, where the mortgagor's equity is substantial, the courts
may set a higher value on his equity of redemption than mere forbearance. But most North
Carolina courts are reluctant to void or remake an otherwise valid agreement because of
nominal consideration. See 253 N.C. at 691.
20 R. Kratovil, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE 38 (2d ed. 1972). This deed
is an absolute conveyance of title in effect as well as in form and is not intended as a mortgage,
trust conveyance, or a security of any kind. The consideration therefore is full release of all
debts, notes, obligations, costs and charges heretofore subsisting on account and by the terms
of that certain mortgage (or trust deed) heretofore existing on the property herein conveyed,
executed by -to
recorded in Book - , page - of the official Records of
County this conveyance completely satisfying said obliga-
tion and terminating said mortgage (or trust deed) and the notes of bonds secured
thereby and any effect thereof in all respects.
21 Affidavit (Mortgagor/Debtor)-(husband and wife) being sworn severally each for
himself, on his oath deposes and says: that a deed of reconveyance on Lot 16 Block 7,
Laurel Acres, Durham, N.C., and dated
was so made, executed, and delivered freely and voluntarily and that affiants intended to
convey absolutely to the grantees named in said deed all of the right, title, interest, claim or
demand in and to said real property, and that your affiants did not and do not now intend that
said deed shall operate as a mortgage, as a trust conveyance, or as a security of any kind.
That at the time said deed was so made, executed and delivered affiants believed and under-
stood, and now believe and understand that the said real property was not and is not k'orth more
than the amount of money due and payable and to become due under the terms of that certain
note and deed of trust heretofore given by your affiants to (mortgagee/creditor) that
affiants believed and continue to believe that their release from personal liability upon said
note and deed of trust constitutes a fair and adequate consideration for said deed. That this
affadavit is made for the protection and benefit of the grantees named in said deed, his suc-
cessors and assigns, and shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns
of your affiants. Your affiants further state and promise that they have not encumbered the
above described property subsequent to the making of a certain Deed of Trust Note and
5
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8. Cancel the note and deed of trust and deliver the same to the mortgagor
thereby releasing the mortgagor of personal liability thereon.
CONCLUSION
The deed in lieu of foreclosure could be a practical and realistic method
of internalizing many of the costs and delays of foreclosure. But the paucity
of recent North Carolina cases in 'this area leads this writer
to draw the conclusion that when the deed is used in lieu of foreclosure,
the parties truly desire the consequences of their acts, and subsequent
litigation in relation to the total number of transactions will be inconse-
quential.
LEONARD T. KELLEY
Deed of Trust dated August 24, 1971 and recorded in the official records of Durham, N.C., in
Book 767, page 514.
State of N. C.
) ss.
Third Judicial Division
(affiants), having been first duly sworn, depose
and say:
1. That they are the persons who executed the foregoing instrument.
2. That they have read the same and know the contents thereof.
3. That the matters stated therein are true to their knowledge except such matters as
are stated upon information and belief, and as to those matters, they believe them to be
true.
(Mortgagor/Debtor)-Husband
(Mortgagor/Debtor)-Wife
Severally, subscribed and sworn to before me this day of
19
NOTARY PUBLIC
My commission expires
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